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We study the intervention problem for public-interest goods. Public-interest goods are known as goods
with positive externalities, allowing the consumer as well as others who do not pay for them benefit
from the consumption. Health related goods, such as vaccines, or products with less carbon emissions are
well known examples. We consider a supply chain for such a product. Generally, wider adoption or usage
of such goods is ensured by the intervention of a central authority in their supply chain. We explore the
problem for a setting composed of a retailer and a central authority. The main goal of the central
authority is to design and fund an intervention scheme so that decisions of the channel are in line with
the good of society, specified as a social welfare function. We propose two intervention tools applied
simultaneously: (1) investing in demand-increasing strategies, which affects the level of the stochastic
demand in the market; and (2) rebates that affect revenue per unit received by the retailer. We introduce
a model that determines a utility maximizing intervention scheme and further investigate the model. We
also present two decentralized approaches as benchmarks. Finally, we conduct a case study for Cali-
fornia's electric vehicle market and validate our findings by a detailed analysis of the results, including
comparisons with the current practice.
& 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
This study is motivated by public-interest goods, which can
also be referred as goods with positive externalities. Health related
products, energy efficient appliances, and recent developments in
green technology (e.g., electric vehicles, solar panels, etc.) are
some notable examples. A distinguishing property of these types
of goods is that in addition to consumers, third parties (who do not
pay for them) enjoy the benefits of their consumption. For
instance, people who get the influenza vaccination reduce the
chances of non-vaccinated people getting the flu. As the examples
indicate, the usage of public-interest goods tremendously benefits
individual customers and the majority of the society, so a central
authority usually intervenes in the supply chain for the good of the
system. Significant examples of intervention include the inter-
vention of the US government, the World Bank, the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, and Tuberculosis and Malaria in distributing medi-
cines, vaccines, and fortified foods to countries in need [33]; the
intervention of the German government in the solar panel market
[25]; the intervention of the French government in conjunctionr Bish.
irci).with the European Union in the petro-chemical industry to
encourage biofuel production [4]; and the intervention of the US
government and states in the electric vehicle market [37]. The
ultimate role of a central authority in such cases is to design and
fund an intervention scheme that will enable the chain to choose
decisions for the benefit of the society, social welfare. The key
question, then, is how to design an intervention scheme that
maximizes social welfare.
This paper considers a general setting composed of a retailer
and a central authority that regulates the system through an
intervention scheme. The intervention has the goal of maximizing
expected utility (social welfare) rather than only maximizing
expected profit. A critical consideration in designing an interven-
tion mechanism is how it should be incorporated into the system.
One alternative is to invest in demand-increasing strategies, such
as advertising, education, research and development, and aware-
ness campaigns, so that the demand pool is enhanced in the
medium to long run. Another alternative can be either offering
rebates to customers or administering subsidies to each unit sold.
In fact, rebates and subsidies per unit sold operate similar to each
other in terms of improving availability of the product at the
retailer via increased unit revenue, and at the same time making
the good more attractive for the customers given the level of their
willingness to pay. So, we refer to the second intervention tool as
rebates in the rest of the paper. Analysis of interventions through
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public-interest goods. For example, Raz and Ovchinnikov [30]
consider an intervention mechanism consisting of rebates and
subsidies for a general class of public-interest goods; Mamani et al.
[27] consider a subsidy program to achieve optimal vaccination
coverage, and Lobel and Perakis [25] consider subsidies to achieve
a desired adoption target for solar photovoltaic technology. Our
work is the first to consider alternative strategies for intervention,
affecting both supply and demand. Specifically, we propose a joint
mechanism, where the central authority uses investment in
demand-increasing strategies and rebates simultaneously. In some
sense, then, the problem is to decide on the optimal allocation of
the central authority's budget among these two intervention tools.
We formulate this framework via bilevel programming. A
bilevel programming problem is a hierarchical optimization pro-
blem that includes two mathematical problems within a single
instance, one of which is part of the constraints of the other. To
summarize, an upper-level decision maker or leader makes his
optimal choice first and then a lower-level decision maker or fol-
lower makes his decision by optimizing his objective given the
dominant player's action. A distinguishing property of this pro-
gramming is that each player's decision is affected by the other's
decision, but is not completely controlled by it (see [10,3] for more
details). In our case, the central authority is the leader, whose
objective is to maximize social welfare, whereas the retailer is the
follower, whose objective is to maximize expected profit. The
central authority decides on the direct investment amount for the
demand-increasing strategies and on the rebate amount per unit,
then the retailer decides on the order quantity. There are few well-
documented cases of direct investment response functions, but
they are generally assumed to be concave for advertising (e.g.
[19,22,1,23]), and we follow the same assumption in this paper.
The concave response function indicates that as the money
invested increases, so does the expected demand, but with a
monotonically diminishing rate. On the other hand, the retailer's
problem is a newsvendor problem incorporating the rebate
amount. The retailer decides on the profit maximizing order
quantity. In addition to developing the modeling perspective, we
characterize the optimal intervention strategy and provide useful
insights for regulating these goods. We also present three bench-
mark approaches: one is a no-intervention case and two are
decentralized approaches that work with a predetermined rebate
amount. Finally, we provide a detailed case study for the California
electric vehicle market that assesses the performance of our
approach relative to the current mechanism and the applicability
of the proposed model.
The first contribution of this paper is using bilevel program-
ming for modeling a newsvendor environment with welfare
implications. Designing a joint mechanism consisting of invest-
ment in demand-increasing strategies as an additional interven-
tion tool and considering a budget are also novel. Further, we
introduce several variations of the model as benchmarks. Finally,
we conduct a case study to analyze the benefit of using the pro-
posed mechanism by implementing a novel parameter calibration
approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
summarizes the related work in the literature, Section 3 presents
our model, along with highlights of some analytical results,
Section 4 introduces benchmark approaches, Section 5 proceeds
with a case study and computational results, and finally, Section 6
presents concluding remarks.2. Literature review
This paper considers the supply chain of a public-interest good,
hence it is closely related to the literature on economics and
operations management.
The economics literature has focused on policy design for
regulating monopolies in the public-interest (see [17,34] for fur-
ther details). Subsidy, tax, and lump-sum transfers are frequently
used as public policy instruments in welfare economics. The
details on how they are used and their effects on the economy are
discussed thoroughly in [16]. Moreover, the impact of intervention
tools (such as subsidies and advertising) for accelerating the dif-
fusion of a new product is investigated in the literature. In this
context, government is concerned with maximizing the number of
adopters while determining the intervention scheme. Here, the
intervention tools directly affect the adoption level. On the other
hand, in our paper we study the intervention problem in a
newsvendor setting, thus the tools are affecting the order quantity.
Some examples from this stream of literature are: [14,18,11].
Horsky and Simon [14] examine the effect of firm's advertising
strategy on the adoption level of a new product, whereas Kalish
and Lilien [18] study the problem of determining a time depen-
dent subsidy scheme under a predetermined government budget.
In a recent study, De Cesare and Di Liddo [11], innovation diffusion
problem is examined for a Stackelberg game. The government
chooses the subsidy amount given a predetermined budget,
whereas the monopolist producer determines the pricing and
advertising strategies.
There is a stream of studies that deals with incentive
mechanism and multi-agent decision making for hierarchical
systems in the context of operations. In hierarchical systems such
as supply chains, health care systems or service organizations,
each stage attempts to maximize its own profit, which never-
theless may not coincide with the optimal decisions for the entire
system. Two early examples of such studies are Schneeweiβ [31]
and Schneeweiss [32]. The latter is a review of more general sys-
tems, where decisions are taken in a distributed manner under
available information for each agent. Additionally, such systems
can be analyzed under varying decision time scales and asym-
metric information availability of agents [39,40]. Compared to this
stream of literature, our approach considers a central authority
with all available information.
When we look at the supply chain literature, we see an
extensive literature focusing on the impact of incentives on the
echelons in a newsvendor environment. Instead of welfare/utility
implications, they focus on the profits of firms while designing
contracts. (See [5] for a detailed review of the supply chain con-
tracting literature.) Although the problem under consideration is a
typical problem seen in various settings, studies that combine an
intervention mechanism and social welfare in a newsvendor set-
ting are scarce and generally focus on a certain product (usually
vaccines) and consider subsidies or rebates as intervention tools.
Refs. [8,12,27,2] are some examples that analyze welfare
implications in the vaccine market while determining the optimal
coverage level. All these studies consider specific details of the
vaccine market, such as infection dynamics and/or yield uncer-
tainty. Chick et al. [8] assume that demand is exogenous to their
model, whereas Deo and Corbett [12] assume that the price is set
after yield is realized. However, Arifoğlu et al. [2] and Mamani
et al. [27] incorporate consumer behavior in this context. The
features of the above-mentioned studies make them inapplicable
to other types of public-interest goods. Regarding health related
products, Taylor and Xiao [33] study design of subsidies from the
perspective of a donor with a budget constraint for improving the
availability of malaria drugs. The authors show that the optimal
subsidy scheme of donor should include only purchase subsidy
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application of the multiscale decision theory approach to health
care. Similar to our approach, objective functions of stakeholders
are monetized.
Lately, the operations management literature has been dealing
with implications of intervention mechanisms on sustainability
(e.g., [24]) and green technologies (e.g., [21,25,15]). Liu et al. [24]
assess the effects of government incentives on the recycling of
waste electrical and electronic equipment in a dual channel set-
ting. Our paper is mostly related to studies on promoting green
technologies. In this domain, Krass et al. [21] investigate the effects
of fixed cost subsidies and taxes placed on emissions regarding the
adoption of green technologies. The authors consider a determi-
nistic price dependent demand and a joint mechanism composed
of taxes and fixed cost subsidies for regulation purposes. Lobel and
Perakis [25] propose a subsidy scheme for motivating the adoption
of solar panels. Instead of maximizing the social benefits of this
technology, they use an adoption target level for deriving the
optimal policy. Huang et al. [15] analyze the impact of a govern-
ment's subsidy incentive scheme for promoting electric auto-
mobiles. Kim et al. [20], on the other hand consider a related
operational model for electric automobiles and conclude that
operational arrangements will be instrumental in increasing the
demand for the product; this can be considered as an example for
demand-increasing strategies.
Raz and Ovchinnikov [30] and Cohen et al. [9] are closest to our
work in terms of analyzing welfare implications in a newsvendor
environment. Our newsvendor setting differs from these studies in
that they present a price-setting newsvendor model, whereas we
assume that demand distribution changes based on investment in
demand-increasing strategies. The former consider a joint inter-
vention mechanism composed of subsidies and rebates for
improving the availability of the public-interest good and max-
imizing social welfare. Also, they use a specific form of social
welfare function consisting of a firm's profit, consumer surplus, an
externality benefit, and government costs. Cohen et al. [9] study a
subsidy design problem for early stages of green technology
adoption. Their model finds a subsidy scheme that maximizes
welfare (composed of the supplier's profit, a consumer surplus,
and government expenditures) in addition to satisfying the given
adoption target level. Both studies enrich their findings by a case
study for Chevy Volt in the US market.
Our paper differs from the above-mentioned studies in three
dimensions: (1) a joint intervention mechanism, consisting of
demand-increasing strategies and rebates; (2) an explicit budget
consideration on the joint intervention mechanism; and (3) a
relatively general social welfare function with the emphasis on
optimizing the budget allocation problem.3. Model
This section describes a unifying framework to design an
intervention mechanism for a general class of public-interest
goods. We utilize this framework for characterizing a strategy
that will encourage the usage of this type of good.
We study the problem in a setting composed of a retailer and a
central authority. In this context, the retailer refers to either an
entity that both manufactures and sells the good, or a coordinated
manufacturer-retailer system. The retailer sells the good to indi-
vidual customers and by its consumption not only the buying
individual but also other individuals benefit. The main goal of the
central authority in this framework is to regulate the system to
increase the good's availability and consumption, and hence col-
lective societal welfare.The central authority regulates the system through a joint
intervention mechanism composed of two different tools:
(1) investment in demand-increasing strategies; and (2) rebates.
The central authority decides on the direct investment amount
made in demand-increasing strategies Bd, the total amount
assigned to rebates Br, the rebate amount r, and the budget B.
Depending on Bd, the distribution function of demand changes.
Note that r is a rebate available to the end customers. More spe-
cifically, let p denote the price the customer is willing to pay for
the good; then the retailer earns a revenue of pþr from each unit
sold. This scheme helps customers buy a good that costs more
money than they would otherwise be willing to pay and improves
the availability of the good at the retailer. We define central
authority's objective function as uðQ ;BdÞB to maximize utility (or
can be named as social welfare), uðQ ;BdÞ reflecting benefits to
society in monetary units, and B capturing the budgetary expenses
of intervention mechanism.
We model the retailer's problem similar to a newsvendor
problem. The retailer decides on the order quantity Q by incurring
a unit acquisition cost c, gaining a unit retail price pþr, and a unit
salvage price s for unsold goods, with the intention of maximizing
the expected profit. However, the distribution of demand depends
on the amount the central authority invested in demand-
increasing strategies, Bd, with pdf f Bd ð:Þ and cdf FBd ð:Þ. Throughout
the study it is assumed that the cdf of demand is monotone
increasing in its argument. The monotonicity of FBd ð:Þ allows us to
use the following implicit fact while showing our results: as the
fractile increases, Q also increases. We assume that there is a
family of demand distribution functions dependent on Bd, and that
changes in the value of Bd lead to a first order stochastic dom-
inance order between cdfs, i.e. let Bd 4cBd ; then FBd has a first
order stochastic dominance over F bBd . Specifically, we impose the
assumption that the cdf of demand at a given value is a decreasing
function of Bd. Thus, it is guaranteed that as Bd increases, so does Q.
The bilevel programming formulation of the problem is as
follows:











where E½PðQ ÞjBd ¼
R Q
0 ððpþrÞxþsðQxÞcQ Þf Bd ðxÞdxþ
R1
Q ðpþr
cÞQf Bd ðxÞdx is the retailer's expected profit.
Notice that D denotes the demand. Eqs. (1)–(6) express the
upper-level problem while (7) corresponds to the lower-level
problem. Constraint (2) ensures that the money invested in Bd
and Br is not more than the budget, whereas constraint (3) limits
the expected total rebate amount to the budget allocated to
rebates. Note that Bd indicates the level of demand to be con-
sidered. Constraint (4) restricts the values that r can take, i.e. it
assures that r is greater than cp so that the cost of underage is
greater than 0. This constraint assures a minimum rebate needed
to have the product available in the market. The non-negativity of
r, Bd, and Br are guaranteed by (5) and (6). Last, (7) reflects the
retailer's problem.
The context discussed can be viewed as a classical leader-
follower game, in which the central authority has the role of leader
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imizing utility (1) and the retailer has the role of follower (or a
lower-level decision maker), with the objective of maximizing
expected profit (7). Note that by modeling this framework by
bilevel programming, we do not solely maximize utility or
expected profit; rather we maximize the retailer's expected profit
under the dominant objective of the central authority.
Remark 1.
(i) The total budget will be summation of Bd and Br at the optimal
solution. Thus, B can be eliminated from the formulation using
equality.
(ii) rE½min Q ;Df gjBd ¼ Br holds at the optimal solution.
Remark 2. For a given Bd, Br, and r, E½PðQ Þ is concave in Q, thus
the solution for the lower-level optimization problem is unique,
implying that the rational reaction set RðBd;Br ; rÞ is single valued
and unique. The uniqueness of RðBd;Br ; rÞ guarantees that the
leader achieves his maximum objective (by Proposition 8.1.1, p.
303 of [3]).
Lemma 3.1. E½PðQ Þ is concave in Q for every Bd, Br, and r. This
assures that the solution to the lower-level problem is unique,
implying that it can be replaced by its first-order condition (by p. 308
of [3]).
Accordingly, Model JM can be written as the following single-
level mathematical program:
Model JMSLP : max
r;Bd ;Br ;Q
uðQ ;BdÞðBdþBrÞ ð8Þ




FBd ðQ Þ ¼
pþrc
pþrs ð13Þ
A general bilevel programming problem is the most challen-
ging of bilevel programs both theoretically and computationally.
By reducing the Model JM to a single-level program, we obtain a
relatively easy program to solve. Henceforth, we continue our
analysis withModel JM-SLP, which is a standard nonlinear program
with a nonlinear objective function and constraints. Note that the
constraint set of Model JM-SLP is not necessarily convex.
3.1. Special case: societal benefit is a linear function of expected sales
In this subsection, we analyze Model JM-SLP for a specific
objective function of the central authority and mean demand
function.
Assumption 1. Suppose that utility function is defined as
β E½min Q ;Df gjBdðBdþBrÞ. Note that β times expected sales is
used to capture the monetary benefits to society, where β is the
monetary value ($) per expected sales. In practice, the central
authority is generally interested in increasing the number of
adopters, so expected sales is a reasonable measure to quantify
benefits.
Assumption 2. Similar to the approach in the advertising litera-




; where a; d; k40: ð14Þ
Specifically, mean demand increases as Bd increases, but with a
monotonically diminishing rate. In this form, as Bd approaches
infinity, demand distribution approaches a limiting distribution
with a mean of μ1. Note that if other parameters of a distribution
are also affected by Bd, they can be modeled similar to (14).
Under this utility function, we can modify the model Model JM-
SLP as follows:
Model SC : max
r;Bd ;Q
ðβrÞE½min Q ;Df gjBdBd ð15Þ






We further analyze Model SC under specific distributions for
demand. We consider exponential and lognormal distributions to
represent family of distributions induced by Bd.
Corollary 3.1. Consider the Model SC given in (15)–(19). Demand
follows a family of distributions dependent on Bd, where mean of the
distribution follows (14). If the family of demand distributions is
exponential or lognormal with constant coefficient of variation, then
the optimal rebate amount is independent of optimal Bd.
Proof is presented in Appendix A.
Corollary 3.1 indicates that the optimal rebate amount is not
affected from investment made in demand-increasing strategies,
efficiency of the strategies, and mean demand before and after
investment. From another perspective, the rebates are indepen-
dent of the planning horizon considered, as one would think that
planning horizon considered will change the parameters of
demand. From the perspective of retailer, optimal fractile value is
constant, regardless the demand parameters, as dictated by the
form of the objective function.
Note that for the lognormal distribution, we hold the coeffi-
cient of variation constant with respect to the changes in the
values of Bd, i.e. variation of demand increases with the increase in
mean demand. Next, we consider an environment in which





; where a; k40: ð20Þ
Note that we can define cvimp as portion of the coefficient of
variation value that can be eliminated. In particular, coefficient of
variation decreases as Bd increases, but with a monotonically
diminishing rate. As Bd approaches infinity, the demand distribu-
tion approaches a limiting distribution with a mean of μ1 and
coefficient of variation of cvmin.
Corollary 3.2. Consider the model Model SC given in (15)–(19),
mean demand function given in (14), and coefficient of variation
function given in (20). If demand is lognormally distributed, then the
optimal rebate amount will be dependent on the optimal Bd.
Proof is presented in Appendix A.
Intuitively, if demand increasing strategies also decrease the
variability of demand, the optimal rebate amount, i.e. optimal
fractile, becomes a function of Bd, as well.
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This section explores three benchmark cases that can be used
to assess the performance of our approach. The benchmark
approaches considered are representations of the mechanism
taking place in practice, where the rebate amount is decided by
the central authority [7].
The first benchmark is an obvious one, no-intervention case,
which may help us better understand the impact of intervention in
this type of system. However, if c4p, the system would not
operate without intervention. Hence, we cannot employ a no
intervention scenario even as a benchmark for c4p cases.
The second benchmark is a decentralized approach, which is
explained in detail in the next subsection, and the third bench-
mark emerges as an extension of it. Note that Remark 1 applies to
these benchmarks as well.
4.1. Decentralized approach
The difference of the decentralized approach from the joint
mechanism is that the problem is solved for a prespecified rebate
amount. In other words, decisions about intervention tools are not
made jointly; specifically, the rebate amount is preset by the
central authority. Under certain demand functions considered in
Corollary 3.1, the preset amount by the central authority may be
the optimal solution. However, under conditions stated by Cor-
ollary 3.2, the rebate amount is a function of Bd.
Our model formulation for this approach is as follows:




4.2. Base decentralized approach
Inspired from the previous case, we construct another refer-
ence, in which the central authority regulates the system only by
rebates that are predetermined by the central authority (i.e. Bd¼0
in this case). We call this approach the base decentralized
approach henceforth. The aim of this approach is to see how the
system operates with a preconcerted rebate amount. No optimi-
zation is needed; newsvendor quantity and expected sales corre-
sponding to the predetermined rebate amount are computed, and
central authority will assign Br accordingly. The following lines
summarize Model BDA:
Model BDA : ComputeuðQ ;Bd ¼ 0ÞBr
where F ðBd ¼ 0ÞðQ Þ ¼
pþrc
pþrs







may-2013-survey.5. Case study: the California electric vehicle market
In this section, we employ the joint intervention mechanism
introduced in Section 3 to explore the intervention mechanism in
the California electric vehicle (EV) market.
According to a report of the World Business Council for Sus-
tainable Development [38], the global light duty vehicle fleet is
projected to be two billion by 2050. Globally, light duty vehicles
are the main contributor of greenhouse gas emissions and deple-
tion of fossil fuel resources [13]. As a response to the increasing
pattern in vehicles on the road and its associated implications on
climate change and resources, EVs have received increasedattention from environmentalists, industry, governments, and
academics in the last decade, and have emerged as a strong
alternative to conventional internal combustion engine vehicles.
As EVs are considered a significant technological breakthrough
with potential environmental benefits, they can be categorized as
public-interest goods. However, they face a combination of cost
and performance issues that limit their competitiveness, which is
why their introduction in the market is ensured by governmental
policies. Foremost examples of such policies are in the US and
European Union, which promote EVs through several programmes
and strategies. A notable number of governments have also
announced the number of EVs they aim to have on roads by certain
dates. For instance, in 2011, US President Obama expressed a target
of one million EVs on the road by 2015.1
In this study, we consider the intervention design problem for a
specific application, the California EV market. Note that we refer to
plug-in hybrids (PHEVs) and all electric vehicles (also called
battery-electric vehicles (BEVs)) as EVs throughout the paper. In
the US, various subsidy schemes have been adopted at the federal
level and even the local level to encourage EV sales. Under the
current policy at the federal level, the government offers subsidies
in the form of a federal income tax credit of up to $7,500 for EVs
purchased in or after 2010, based on the capacity of the battery
used to fuel the vehicle.2 At the state level, California implements a
special consumer incentive program, the Clean Vehicle Rebate
Project (CVRP), to promote the adoption of clean vehicles.3 The
project was launched in March 2010 and expected to end in 2015.
Under the CVRP, individuals, nonprofits, government entities, and
businesses can receive a rebate up to $5000 on top of the $7500
federal tax credit for the purchase of eligible vehicles, which
include zero emission vehicles (ZEVs) (BEVs are categorized as
ZEVs), PHEVs, neighborhood electric vehicles (NEVs), and zero
emission motorcycles (ZEMs). According to current statistics,
California is the leading state in clean vehicle adoption: although
the state constitutes 10% of the total US car market, 40% of all
PHEVs purchases are from California.4 Also, a May 2013 PHEV
driver survey5 reports that 47% of purchasers rate the state rebate
as the most important factor in their decision to purchase a PHEV.
From these statistics, we can better understand the significance of
a state rebate on the motivation for EV purchases.
Most of the infrastructural investment to increase the efficiency
and reliability of the technology is expected to attract more cus-
tomer demand (see p. 8, [36]). Following the discussion on the
pp. 6–7 of the document [36], on the other hand, these R&D
investments mostly were completed before 2012, and hence we
assume that those effects are already reflected in the current
demand estimates.
Unfortunately, however, the statistics indicate that current
policies are insufficient to reach nationwide goals on clean vehicle
market growth. According to an Information Technology and
Innovation Foundation report [13], the right policy to encourage
mass adoption of electric vehicles is a combination of subsidies
and battery research funding to remove technological barriers,
which parallels the mechanism we introduce in Section 3. Electric
vehicles have been only recently introduced in the market and
their ongoing development is open ended, dependent on invest-
ments in battery improvement technologies and production
Table 1
Demand forecasts of EVs.





Demand model's parameters for base case scenario.
Distribution cv s μ1d d α
Exponential 1 23,040 169,175 163,384 0.56
1 18,720 305,119 27,440 0.09
Lognormal 0.8 23,040 97,543 235,016 0.81
1 23,040 118,124 214,435 0.74
1.2 23,040 141,205 191,354 0.66
0.8 18,720 125,453 207,106 0.72
1 18,720 159,500 173,059 0.60
1.2 18,720 198,963 133,596 0.46
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improve battery technology, but these developments must be
fostered more aggressively. Thus, balancing available funds
between research and development, and rebates is a key issue in
resolving the adoption problem.
We use the newsvendor context in the EV example, which
implies that there is a single period and a monopolist retailer.
Obviously, the retailer does not make a single production decision;
instead he is making major decisions each year, and then more
detailed decisions each month or week. Hence, it is critical to
emphasize that the quantities found should be interpreted as
capacity decisions of the retailer. Also, there are many EV models
and hence competing manufacturing firms available in the market.
However, in this problem we aggregate the retailers and investi-
gate the industry-wide problem, because our main concern is the
reaction of the industry to the intervention mechanism.
Specifically, our numerical study addresses the following
issues: (1) the value of the joint mechanism, (2) the performance
of the joint mechanism in short-term versus long-term planning,
(3) the impact of uncertainty on the results, and (4) the applic-
ability of the proposed model.
Before proceeding with the numerical results, we first describe
the demand model, objective function, and how we choose and
calibrated parameter values.
5.1. Demand model and objective function
We use two different distributions to represent EV demand and
conduct separate computational studies to evaluate the robustness
of the results with respect to distribution. The demand of a pro-
duct like an EV, which is in the early stages of adoption, is
expected to be highly uncertain. So, at first we assume demand to
be exponentially distributed. Subsequently, we consider the case
that demand follows a lognormal distribution, as it allows us to
assess the impact of demand uncertainty on the results. Note that
we consider the mean demand function given in (14) for both
distributions.
Motivated by the EV market's circumstances, we choose the
central authority's utility function as given in Assumption 1. By
utilizing this objective, we choose expected sales value to assess
the benefits to society for this application. The US government is
concerned with increasing the number of EVs on the road, and
President Obama has announced an adoption target. Therefore, the
expected sales will be a realistic function to capture benefits to
society and it is consistent with the current market environment.6
5.2. Choice of parameter values
The cost parameters in this numerical study are based on the
market data of a specific model, the Nissan Leaf. The Leaf is an all
electric vehicle constituting a global market share of 45% as of the
first quarter of 2014 [28]. The manufacturer's suggested retail price
(MSRP) for the Leaf 2013 is $28,800 [29] in the US, and it is eligible
for a rebate of $2500 by the CVRP7 on top of a federal income tax
credit of $7500.8 Thus, the price the customer is willing to pay is
reduced to $18,800. Also, from market data we find out that the
factory invoice, i.e. the amount the manufacturer charges the
dealer (c), is $26,986 [35].6 One discussion is whether increasing sales of vehicles really does benefit
society, regardless of whether what is sold is an EV. The utility function considered
is expected to decrease for some large sales levels due to both concavity of
expected sales and subtraction of budgetary expenses from monetary value of
expected sales.
7 http://energycenter.org/clean-vehicle-rebate-project.
8 http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/taxevb.shtml.The demand model's parameters are derived from the Cali-
fornia Energy Commission's report on state energy demand fore-
casts between the years 2012 and 2022 [6] and statistics obtained
from the California Center for Sustainable Energy (CCSE)'s
website.9 The California Energy Commission's report tabulates the
projected number of BEVs and PHEVs on the road for low scenario
and high scenario cases for selected years between 2011 and 2022.
Accordingly, the forecasts of the relevant periods are listed in
Table 1.
The CCSE's website offers interactive access to data and ana-
lyses of the CVRP project. From the database accessed at the end of
January 2014, we determine that the rebates issued under this
program as of the end of 2013 were approximately $95 million for
45,000 vehicles (note that we only consider rebates given to ZEVs
and PHEVs in this calculation). Thus, the realized rebate is $2116
per vehicle for the current case in addition to the federal tax credit
of $7500.
We utilize the current structure of the intervention mechanism
and realized outcomes to set the demand model's parameters (μ1
and d in Eq. (14)) for the three years period of 2011 through 2013,
and set the salvage value to its final values. As noted earlier, r is
$2116 per vehicle and sales up to end of 2013 were 45,000. By
setting expected sales equal to 45,000 we obtain a condition that
yields a relationship between s and μ1d when solved together
with the newsvendor optimality condition, particularly for each
distribution. Note that these conditions are determined under the
assumption that no investment is made in battery development
during these years (i.e. Bd¼0). Note that this is consistent with
what is reported on the pp 6–7 of [36]. However, we can also
interpret the value of Bd as additional investment, if the current
policy includes investment for battery development. We test our
model for both low and high salvage values, which are 65% and
80% of the MSRP value, respectively. Following the conditions we
derived, s and μ1d pairs considered for the current structure
appear to be as tabulated in Table 2. Next, we find d values cor-
responding to these pairs by fixing μ1 to the total forecast of the
high scenario for these years, 332,559. Notice that as the salvage
value increases so does d. This result indicates that the potential to
improve demand by investing in battery development is high for
larger salvage values. Moreover, we assume the values of a and k to
be, respectively, 1.1 and 108 throughout the analysis.9 http://energycenter.org/clean-vehicle-rebate-project/cvrp-project-statistics.
Table 4
Percentage improvement of the utility with respect to current policy when
β¼4150.
cv s¼$23,040 s¼$18,720
Exp. dist. (%) Logn. dist. (%) Exp. dist. (%) Logn. dist. (%)
0.8 47.0 19.8
1 0.03 20.1 0.8 5.4
1.2 6.5 3.0
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Combining the estimate of μ1d, and the yearly forecasts in years
2011 and 2013 for the low and high scenarios (i.e.
αð43;113Þþð1αÞð332;559Þ ¼ μ1d), we obtain α values, as in
Table 2. Assuming that the same state of the world is preserved,
we use α values to estimate the demand parameters of future
periods for each particular data set. Similar to Table 2 above, we
present the demand model's parameters to be used for medium-
and long-term scenarios in Appendix B.
To determine the monetary value per expected sales (β), we
use a version of the proposed model to calibrate the parameter.
We specifically solve a subproblem of Model JM, which is provided
in Appendix C. This subproblem decides on Bd, Br, r, and Q with the
objective of maximizing expected sales for a given budget level.
Note that the constraints are similar to those in Model JM. As input,
we rely on the cost and demand model's data described above and
we consider the budget spent as of the end of 2013 ($95 million).
We solve the subproblem for exponential distribution and log-
normal distribution with varying coefficient of variation values.
Next, we extract the Lagrange multiplier value of constraint (C.2),
which gives us the marginal increase in the expected sales from a
unit relaxation of the budget. Note that reciprocal of the Lagrange
multiplier corresponds to the monetary value of expected sales, β.
We report the estimated β values for each case in Table C1 in
Appendix C. To be inclusive, we consider the range for β as [3200–
5100], and use the upper and lower limit, and intermediate value
of the range in the numerical studies, which are {3200,
4150, 5100}.
We conduct three sets of analyses for exponential distribution
and lognormal distribution with varying coefficient of variation
values: (1) base-case scenario (current structure) using the esti-
mates discussed in this subsection, (2) medium-term scenario
including the years 2011 through 2015, and (3) long term scenario
including the years 2011 through 2022.
Before continuing with the numerical results, we list the
parameters that take the same values for each scenario: p¼26,300,
c¼26,986, a¼1.1, and k¼ 108. Note that p¼26,300 considers
18,800, amount customer is willing to pay, plus 7500 tax credit
that comes from the federal government, which is not a part of
California's budget. Further, if lognormal distribution is used to
represent the demand, we restrict our analysis for constant coef-
ficient of variation.
5.3. Main results
The cases considered in the computational study are labeled
and summarized in Table 3. Notice that the letters in labels are
assigned in the order of increasing values of β first, then in
increasing values of coefficient of variation. For each set, weTable 3
Cases considered in the computational study.
Case no. Distribution cv
1a, 1b, 1c Exponential 1
2a, 2b, 2c Exponential 1
3a–3i Lognormal {0.8, 1, 1.2}
4a–4i Lognormal {0.8, 1, 1.2}
5a, 5b, 5c Exponential 1
6a, 6b, 6c Exponential 1
7a–7i Lognormal {0.8, 1, 1.2}
8a–8i Lognormal {0.8, 1, 1.2}
9a, 9b, 9c Exponential 1
10a, 10b, 10c Exponential 1
11a–11i Lognormal {0.8, 1, 1.2}
12a–12i Lognormal {0.8, 1, 1.2}tabulate the results in Appendix D for the joint mechanism (JM),
and also for the decentralized (DA) and base decentralized (BDA)
approaches, which can be regarded as benchmarks. The tables
include utility values, expected sales, details of the mechanisms,
mean demand, and expected profit of the retailer, which is cal-
culated by expression (7). For the case study, we solve the
decentralized and base decentralized approaches with a given
rebate of $2116, which is the current realized rebate in California.
A no-intervention case cannot be employed as a benchmark for
this case, because c4p and rebate must be given for the system to
operate. It is necessary to reemphasize that the quantities pre-
sented throughout the study should not be interpreted as the
number of vehicles to be manufactured, but as the capacity plan of
the retailer.
5.3.1. Base-case scenario (2011–2013)
For this scenario set, we consider cases 1a through 4i and
demonstrate their associated results in Tables D1–D3 in Appendix D.
When exponential distribution is used to represent demand,
we observe that the joint mechanism is not applied in general,
mainly due to the structure of distribution and the cost values.
Since c4p for the vehicles and uncertainty is very high, the cen-
tral authority gives priority to increasing the vehicle's profitability
to encourage the retailer to order more. However, when lognormal
distribution is under consideration, the joint mechanism is
implemented for most of the cases.
For this scenario set, we report the percentage improvement
obtained by implementing the joint mechanism compared to the
current policy (Model BDA) for the medium β value in Table 4. The
percentage values indicate that the percentage utility loss is
minimal, less than 1%, when demand distribution is exponential.
Thus, we can say that the current policy is reasonable if expo-
nential distribution is a better candidate to represent the demand.
On the other hand, the joint mechanism performs better than the
current policy under lognormal distribution.
One can also see from the solutions that the changes in results
are as expected in response to the changes in β. Particularly, utility,
expected sales, rebate amount, quantity ordered, and the retailer'sHorizon s ($) β($)
Base case 23,040 {3200,4150,5100}
Base case 18,720 {3200,4150,5100}
Base case 23,040 {3200,4150,5100}
Base case 18,720 {3200,4150,5100}
Medium term 23,040 {3200,4150,5100}
Medium term 18,720 {3200,4150,5100}
Medium term 23,040 {3200,4150,5100}
Medium term 18,720 {3200,4150,5100}
Long term 23,040 {3200,4150,5100}
Long term 18,720 {3200,4150,5100}
Long term 23,040 {3200,4150,5100}
Long term 18,720 {3200,4150,5100}
Table 5
Percentage improvement of the utility with respect to current policy in the long-
term when β¼4150.
cv s¼$23,040 s¼$18,720
Exp. dist. (%) Logn. dist. (%) Exp. dist. (%) Logn. dist. (%)
0.8 123.7 85.0
1 34.7 87.5 0.8 49.2
1.2 60.2 24.8
Table 7
Retailer's expected profit ($(106)) when β¼ 4150 and s¼23,040.
cv Base case Medium term Long term
Exp. dist. Logn. dist. Exp. dist. Logn. dist. Exp. dist. Logn. dist.
0.8 49.6 215.7 822.7
1 36.9 42.7 171.8 192.3 674.7 743.0
1.2 36.8 170.1 663.8
Table 6
Rebate amounts ($) when β¼ 4150 and s¼23,040.
cv Base case Medium term Long term
Exp. dist. Logn. dist. Exp. dist. Logn. dist. Exp. dist. Logn. dist.
0.8 1569 1569 1569
1 2147 1689 2147 1689 2147 1689
1.2 1785 1785 1785
Table 8
Utility ð$ð106ÞÞ when β¼ 4150 and s¼ 23;040.
cv Base case Medium term Long term
Exp. dist. Logn. dist. Exp. dist. Logn. dist. Exp. dist. Logn. dist.
0.8 134.5 656.2 2833.9
1 91.6 109.9 351.1 515.1 1487.3 2244.2
1.2 97.5 422.1 1830.9
Table 9
Percentage improvement of utility achieved by joint mechanism with respect to
base decentralized approach (%) when β¼ 4150 and s¼23,040.
cv Base case (%) Medium term (%) Long term (%)
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cases that implement the joint mechanism, Bd increases if β
increases, which consequently makes the joint mechanism more
valuable. In summary, as very much expected, the adoption of
vehicles is accelerated with an increase in the benefits to society
per unit of expected sales.
Note that we can explore the problem by analyzing Pareto
optimal curve along which optimal budget and expected sales or
utility are shown. Fig. 1a and b in Appendix E depict Pareto optimal
curves for one of the parameter settings.
5.3.2. Medium- (2011–2015) and long-term scenarios (2011–2022)
The details of the solutions for the cases considered can be
found in Tables D4–D6 and in Tables D7–D9 in Appendix D for
medium- and long-term, respectively.
After analyzing all scenarios, we see that the value of the joint
mechanism in terms of utility is substantial for the cases with high
s or d values. Moreover, we observe that the value of the joint
mechanism is especially recognized in long-term planning (see
Table 5). Long-term planning allows one to clearly see the evolu-
tion of demand by the investment amount and thus helps the
central authority better manage the budget.
The other observations and findings related to mechanism
performance are similar to the base-case.
5.3.3. Consistency check with US administration targets
We perform the medium-term scenario analysis to observe
whether the 2015 goals10 are met under the mild assumption that
the same state of the world is preserved. As discussed earlier,
California constitutes 10% of the total car market in 2013. Thus,
using 10% the goal for our case emerges as having about 100,000
EVs on the road in California by 2015. On the other hand, 2013
statistics on EV purchases reveal that 40% of sales are in California.
The results obtained by joint mechanism take values between
100,000 and 400,000, which imply that the numbers obtained by
the proposed mechanism are within the 10–40% bound. This can
be interpreted as follows: as the number of vehicles on the road
increases, one would expect California dominance on sales per-
centage to drop, as there will be increasing sales in other US states
as well.
Moreover, according to an article published in New York
Times,11 there are 150,000 electric vehicles in California by the end
of 2015. Expected sales values found by base decentralized
approach (reflecting the current practice) in the medium term are
very close to the realized sales, i.e. in the range of
½134;600;146;600, which can be considered as another bench-
mark validating our parameter estimations.
5.4. Analysis of results
In this section, we use the numerical results provided in the
previous section as a basis to further investigate two main issues:
(1) the impact of uncertainty on the solutions, and (2) expected
excess budget required.
5.4.1. Impact of uncertainty
The results of the lognormal distribution case indicate that
demand uncertainty can have a huge impact on the results, hence
this leads us to investigate the impact of uncertainty on four
specific outcomes: (i) rebate amounts issued, (ii) the retailer's
expected profit, (iii) utility attained, and (iv) percentage10 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-pre
sident-state-union-address.
11 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/01/science/electric-car-auto-dealers.
html?smid¼nytcore-ipad-share&smprod¼nytcore-ipad&_r¼0.improvement compared to base decentralized approach. We
report the analysis for only one salvage value, i.e. $23,040, at the
medium β level, i.e. 4150, since the findings are similar to other
combinations of salvage value and β values. Tables 6–10 show how
each of these outcomes varies with the level of uncertainty under
different horizons.
 Rebate amount: The impact of the increase in demand variability
is in two levels, i.e. it decreases the potential to improve
demand (d value) while increasing the retailer's risks of over-
ordering and under-ordering. These conditions thus result inExp. dist. Logn. dist. Exp. dist. Logn. dist. Exp. dist. Logn. dist.
0.8 47.0 139.6 123.7
1 0.03 20.1 20.9 84.1 34.7 87.5
1.2 6.5 48.5 60.2
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Moreover, we observe that the rebate amounts remain constant
with respect to changes in the horizon length as shown in
Corollary 3.1.
 Retailer's expected profit: The values given in Table 7 are the
retailer's expected profit for the whole horizon of the associated
scenario. When comparing the expected profit for varying
demand uncertainty levels, as expected profit is smaller for
higher values of the coefficient of variation. This observation
implies that the retailer suffers from increasing levels of
demand uncertainty in terms of expected profit.
 Utility and percentage improvement with respect to the current
policy: The best results in terms of utility (or utility per year,
which can roughly be found by dividing the numbers in Table 8
by the number of years considered in the corresponding case)
appears when the coefficient of variation is lowest. Moreover,
the results in Table 9 display the negative impact of uncertainty
on the performance of the joint mechanism relative to the
current policy (base decentralized approach). The reason behind
this finding is that the investment made in battery development
only affects the mean of the demand while increasing the
variation proportionally. However, if a demand-increasing strat-
egy that will also reduce variability is implemented, the joint
mechanism will be more effective for higher demand values.
Another benchmark to use would be decentralized approach
(Model DA). Model DA allows for spending on demand-increasing
strategies, while setting the rebate value to its current level. Per-
centage improvement of utility achieved by Model DA relative to
current practice is presented in Table 10. Note that considering
both intervention strategies, even one of them is set with respect
to other considerations, will improve today's solution.
5.4.2. Expected excess budget required
We express the budget constraint on the amount of rebates
(Eq. (9)) in terms of expected sales. This formulation may lead to
the discovery that the actual cost of rebates is higher than Br once
the demand is realized. Thus, we quantify the expected excess
budget required to check whether the amounts are reasonable.Table 10
Percentage improvement of utility achieved by decentralized approach with
respect to base decentralized approach (%) when β¼ 4150 and s¼23,040.
cv Base case (%) Medium term (%) Long term (%)
Exp. dist. Logn. dist. Exp. dist. Logn. dist. Exp. dist. Logn. dist.
0.8 32.1 117.8 105.7
1 0.0 12.8 20.8 73.4 34.7 77.8
1.2 2.9 43.1 55.0
Table 11
Expected excess budget required ($(106),%) when β¼ 4150 and s¼23,040.
Mechanism cv Base case M
Exp. dist. Logn. dist. Ex
JM 0.8 (5.3,3.1%)
1 (12.1,12.4%) (5.8,4.3%) (5
1.2 (6.0,5.7%)
Dec. 0.8 (12.3,5.3%)
1 (11.6,12.2%) (11.0,6.3%) (5
1.2 (9.8,7.5%)
Base Dec. 0.8 (6.5,6.8%)
1 (11.6,12.2%) (7.4,7.8%) (3
1.2 (8.1,8.5%)Defining E½EB as expected excess budget required, we measure it
by









Note that the expected budget overflow is equal to this amount.
Table 11 displays the expected excess budget required and its
percentage relative to the applicable budget in parentheses,
respectively. Again, we only show the results for the salvage value
of $23,040 at the medium β value for the three mechanisms
considered. Recall that the rebates issued under the joint
mechanism are less in relation to the decentralized and base
decentralized approaches, which is why in general the percentage
of E½EB relative to budget is larger for the decentralized and base
decentralized approaches. The results indicate that the govern-
ment has more risk if it regulates the system by a single inter-
vention tool. Moreover, if we evaluate the expected excess budget
required on the basis of the percentage of budget under con-
sideration, we observe that the percentages vary from 3.1% to
12.4%. Thus, we can conclude that the expected excess budget
required does not appear to be too large relative to the govern-
ment's budget.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the problem of designing an interven-
tion mechanism for public-interest goods. More specifically, we
consider a system composed of a retailer and a central authority
that regulates the system through a joint mechanism in which
demand-increasing strategies and rebates are used. The main goal
of the intervention is to encourage the retailer to make decisions
that would best benefit the system. By formulating the system via
bilevel programming, we do not solely maximize utility, but also
consider the retailer's expected profit. We characterize the struc-
ture of the solution and show that the rebate amount may be
independent of the investment made in demand-increasing stra-
tegies and improvement pattern of mean demand.
In this study, we define expected excess budget that plays a
supportive role in decisions to be made. We believe that with
stochastic constraints, such quantities should be computed to
reflect possible risks in the decisions made.
We attempt to validate the benefits of our model with available
data from the California electric vehicle market. The results of this
case study demonstrate that the joint mechanism brings con-
siderable benefits in terms of utility.
Another important finding of the case study is that when the
problem is solved considering longer horizons, the proposed joint
mechanism exploits the range of possibilities more extensively.edium term Long term
p. dist. Logn. dist. Exp. dist. Logn. dist.
(23.3,3.4%) (88.7,3.9%)
6.6,10.6%) (26.2,4.4%) (222.1,11.2%) (101.2,5.0%)
(27.6,5.4%) (107.6,6.0%)
(54.5,5.6%) (209.5,6.1%)
4.1,10.4%) (50.3,6.4%) (212.3,11.0%) (195.2,7.0%)
(45.5,7.1%) (178.0,7.6%)
(19.4,6.8%) (89.9,6.8%)
6.9,12.2%) (22.6,7.8%) (140.0,12.2%) (96.7,7.8%)
(25.2,8.5%) (101.3,8.5%)
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factor for the environment considered in the case study. Based on
our results, we conclude that approaches that do not consider
demand variability may lead to erroneous decisions. This finding is
especially apparent in the decision on rebate quantity, as well as in
the expected budget that would be required by the central
authority.
Note that this modeling framework can be modified for alter-
native intervention mechanisms, i.e. a subsidy given to the retailer
per unit ordered or direct investment affecting any other para-
meter of the system. Since both mechanisms achieve similar
results, we do not analyze them in depth. This possibility allows
the central authority the ability to formulate a bilevel program for
each intervention scheme and compare the effect of each scheme.
Another improvement can be to represent more than one factor
that will change the mean demand, each factor requiring a sepa-
rate budget. A good example can be depicted from [26]: R&D
efficiency is not only a function of research expenditure, but also
research manpower. Hence, more realistic representations can be
used to replace Eqs. (14) and (20).Appendix A. ProofsTable B2
Demand model's parameters ðμ1; dÞ for long-term scenario.
cv s¼$23,040 s¼$18,720

















The numbers are presented with precision so that they can be used for performing





1FBd ðQ Þ ¼ c spþ r s
 
. Hence, we can express expected sales as:
E½min Q ;Df gjBd ¼











Using (A.1) for the expected sales, the objective function can be
written as:
uðBd; rÞ ¼ ðβrÞ












Next, we consider first order condition of (A.2) with respect to r,
which is given below:
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ðA:3Þ
After evaluating (A.3) for exponential and lognormal distributionTable B1
Demand model's parameters (μ1; d) for medium-term scenario.
cv s¼$23,040
Exp. dist. Logn. dist.
0.8 (1,081,703, 789,863)
1 (1,081,703, 544,766) (1,081,703, 720,692)
1.2 (1,081,703, 643,120)and rearranging, it can be shown that optimal rebate is indepen-
dent of μðBdÞ for the mentioned distributions.
(i) Assume that demand is exponentially distributed with mean

























After rearranging (A.4), one can show that r can be found byffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
βðcsÞþcðpsÞsðpsÞ
p
ðpsÞ, which is independent of Bd
and μðBdÞ.
(ii) Assume that demand is lognormally distributed with
parameters ðv; τÞ and mean μðBdÞ. Note that μðBdÞ ¼ evþ τ2=2.
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Using μðBdÞ ¼ evþτ2=2, one can show that (A.5) can be expressed
independent of μðBdÞ and the result follows. □
Proof of Corollary 3.2. This proof is similar to that of Corollary 3.1.
Specifically, evaluating (A.3) with mean demand function given in
(14) and coefficient of variation function given in (20), and rear-
ranging give the result. Of course, in this case Bd cannot be elimi-
nated in (A.3). □Appendix B. Demand model's parameters for medium- and
long-term scenarios
See Tables B1 and B2.s¼$18,720
Exp. dist. Logn. dist.
(1,081,703, 696,060)
(1,081,703, 87,552) (1,081,703, 581,632)
(1,081,703, 449,001)




E½min Q ;Df gjBd ðC:1Þ
s:t: BdþBrrB ðC:2Þ




FBd ðQ Þ ¼
pþrc
pþrs ðC:7Þ
Proposition C.1. Consider the objective function given in (C.1). Then,
the following relationships hold at the optimal solution,
ðrn;Qn;Bnd;Bnr Þ:
a) rnE½min Qn;D	 
jBd ¼ Bnr ,
b) BndþBnr ¼ B.
Proof. (a) Suppose to the contrary that there exists some solution
ðr ;Q ;Bnd;Bnr Þ such that rarn, Q aQn, rE½min Q ;D
n o
jBd ¼ BndoBnr ,
and it has a higher objective function value. Assume that we keep
Bnd and B
n
r constant and increase r by ϵ, then we will arrive at aTable C1
Calibrated β values.
cv s¼$23,040 s¼$18,720
Exp. dist. Logn. dist. Exp. dist. Logn. dist.
0.8 3132 3802
1 4058 3582 3788 4487
1.2 4012 5161
Table D1
Solutions of base-case scenario for cases 1 and 2.
Case β Mechanism Objective Exp. sales Q
Nb. ($) ($ 106) (103 vehicles) (103 vehi
1a 3200 JM 52.1 37.0 41.7
DA 48.8 45.0 52.3
BDA 48.8 45.0 52.3
1b 4150 JM 91.6 45.7 53.3
DA 91.5 45.0 52.3
BDA 91.5 45.0 52.3
1c 5100 JM 142.8 62.3 74.7
DA 137.9 52.4 60.9
BDA 134.3 45.0 52.3
2a 3200 JM 50.8 37.9 40.5
DA 48.8 45.0 48.7
BDA 48.8 45.0 48.7
2b 4150 JM 92.2 49.0 53.4
DA 91.5 45.0 48.7
BDA 91.5 45.0 48.7
2c 5100 JM 143.5 58.8 65.3
DA 134.3 45.0 48.7
BDA 134.3 45.0 48.7solution ðbr ; bQ ;Bnd;Bnr Þ, for which bQ 4Q by the monotonicity of FBd .
Since the objective function is increasing concave with respect to
Q, the new solution will give a higher objective value, which
contradicts with optimality. Continuing in this manner, i.e.
increasing r by small increments, we will reach ðrn;Qn;Bnd;Bnr Þ. The
result then follows.
b) We follow the same logic as in part (a). Suppose for a con-
tradiction that there exists some solution ðr ;Q ;Bd ;Br Þ such that
Bd þBr oB, and it has a higher objective function value. This
implies that either Bd oBnd or Br oBnr , or both.
When Bd oBnd; if we increase Bd by ϵ, we will arrive at a
solution ðr ; bQ ;cBd ;Br Þ for which bQ 4Q by the first order stochastic
dominance order of cdfs. Since the objective function is increasing
with respect to Q and Bd, the new solution will result in a higher
objective function value, which contradicts with optimality.
When Br oBnr ; if we increase Br by ϵ, r and Q also increase by
part (a). Now, we arrive at a new solution ð~r ; ~Q ;Bd ; ~Br Þ, for which
~r4r and thus ~Q 4Q by the monotonicity of cdf. ~Q has a higher
objective function value, which contradicts with optimality.
Last, if both Bd oBnd and Br oBnr , we can arrive at a better
solution by playing with Bd and Br values in the same manner as in
the previous cases, and this contradicts with the optimality of
ðr ;Q ;Bd ;Br Þ. In each of the three cases, by continuing to increase
the values of Bd or/and Br, we can achieve the optimal solution
ðrn;Qn;Bnd;Bnr Þ. The result then follows. □
Note that one can solve the subproblem using the tightness of
the budget-related constraints, (C.2) and (C.3).Appendix D. Computational results
We solve our models by the nonlinear solver CONOPT within
the GAMS environment. We also perform runs with different
nonlinear solvers included in GAMS environment, such as MINOS,
BARON, KNITRO, etc. However, we attempt to solve our data
instances with CONOPT because it produces more reliable results.
The solutions are obtained very quickly, in approximately 0.004 s,
because the problems are not very large.r Bd Br E[P(Q)] μðBdÞ
cles) ($) ($ 106) ($ 106) ($ 106) (103 vehicles)
1789 0.0 66.1 22.0 169.2
2116 0.0 95.2 35.5 169.2
2116 0.0 95.2 35.5 169.2
2147 0.0 98.2 36.9 169.2
2116 0.0 95.2 35.5 169.2
2116 0.0 95.2 35.5 169.2
2484 20.2 154.8 63.0 199.1
2116 18.4 110.8 41.3 196.9
2116 0.0 95.2 35.5 169.2
1860 0.0 70.6 23.2 305.1
2116 0.0 95.2 33.9 305.1
2116 0.0 95.2 33.9 305.1
2267 0.0 111.0 41.0 305.1
2116 0.0 95.2 33.9 305.1
2116 0.0 95.2 33.9 305.1
2658 0.0 156.2 62.1 305.1
2116 0.0 95.2 33.9 305.1
2116 0.0 95.2 33.9 305.1
Table D2
Solutions of base-case scenario for case 3.
Case β Mechanism Objective Exp. sales Q r Bd Br E[P(Q)] μðBdÞ
Nb. ($) ($ 106) (103 vehicles) (103 vehicles) ($) ($ 106) ($ 106) ($ 106) (103 vehicles)
3a 3200 JM 72.9 54.2 56.3 1324 28.7 71.7 26.2 154.6
DA 50.6 58.6 64.0 2116 13.0 124.1 62.9 127.1
BDA 48.8 45.0 49.1 2116 0.0 95.2 48.3 97.5
3b 4150 JM 134.5 74.6 78.7 1569 58.0 117.0 49.6 190.5
DA 120.9 85.3 93.0 2116 52.5 180.4 91.4 184.8
BDA 91.5 45.0 49.1 2116 0.0 95.2 48.3 97.5
3c 5100 JM 213.2 90.4 96.8 1806 84.5 163.2 76.0 212.7
DA 208.4 97.7 106.5 2116 83.0 206.6 104.7 211.7
BDA 134.3 45.0 49.1 2116 0.0 95.2 48.3 97.5
3d 3200 JM 62.1 40.3 42.4 1413 9.9 57.0 21.1 139.3
DA 48.8 45.0 49.6 2116 0.0 95.2 46.0 118.1
BDA 48.8 45.0 49.6 2116 0.0 95.2 46.0 118.1
3e 4150 JM 109.9 59.4 63.7 1689 36.3 100.3 42.7 180.0
DA 103.3 67.1 74.1 2116 33.3 142.0 68.7 176.2
BDA 91.5 45.0 49.6 2116 0.0 95.2 46.0 118.1
3f 5100 JM 173.7 74.4 81.3 1956 60.3 145.6 67.7 204.9
DA 172.7 78.0 86.0 2116 59.9 165.0 79.7 204.6
BDA 134.3 45.0 49.6 2116 0.0 95.2 46.0 118.1
3 g 3200 JM 58.9 34.3 36.4 1483 0.0 50.9 19.0 141.2
DA 48.8 45.0 50.1 2116 0.0 95.2 44.2 141.2
BDA 48.8 45.0 50.1 2116 0.0 95.2 44.2 141.2
3h 4150 JM 97.5 48.6 52.9 1785 17.6 86.8 36.8 172.4
DA 94.2 54.2 60.3 2116 15.9 114.6 53.2 169.9
BDA 91.5 45.0 50.1 2116 0.0 95.2 44.2 141.2
3i 5100 JM 150.6 62.8 69.7 2077 39.2 130.4 60.0 199.5
DA 150.6 63.6 70.8 2116 39.2 134.5 62.5 199.5
BDA 134.3 45.0 50.1 2116 0.0 95.2 44.2 141.2
Table D3
Solutions of base-case scenario for case 4.
Case β Mechanism Objective Exp. sales Q r Bd Br E[P(Q)] μðBdÞ
Nb. ($) ($ 106) (103 vehicles) (103 vehicles) ($) ($ 106) ($ 106) ($ 106) (103 vehicles)
4a 3200 JM 65.2 38.4 39.1 1299 7.8 49.9 18.1 142.0
DA 48.8 45.0 46.9 2116 0.0 95.2 48.7 125.5
BDA 48.8 45.0 46.9 2116 0.0 95.2 48.7 125.5
4b 4150 JM 109.6 54.5 55.8 1549 32.1 84.4 35.9 180.0
DA 99.5 62.4 65.0 2116 27.4 132.0 67.4 173.8
BDA 91.5 45.0 46.9 2116 0.0 95.2 48.7 125.5
4c 5100 JM 167.6 67.1 69.3 1799 54.0 120.8 56.8 203.8
DA 164.1 72.7 75.8 2116 52.9 153.9 78.6 202.7
BDA 134.3 45.0 46.9 2116 0.0 95.2 48.7 125.5
4d 3200 JM 61.4 33.9 34.7 1388 0.0 47.0 17.5 159.5
DA 48.8 45.0 47.2 2116 0.0 95.2 46.5 159.5
BDA 48.8 45.0 47.2 2116 0.0 95.2 46.5 159.5
4e 4150 JM 96.5 41.6 43.0 1672 6.7 69.6 29.9 171.4
DA 91.7 47.2 49.5 2116 4.3 99.9 48.8 167.3
BDA 91.5 45.0 47.2 2116 0.0 95.2 46.5 159.5
4f 5100 JM 141.7 53.1 55.4 1955 25.4 103.9 48.9 197.7
DA 141.0 55.7 58.4 2116 25.2 117.8 57.5 197.4
BDA 134.3 45.0 47.2 2116 0.0 95.2 46.5 159.5
4g 3200 JM 59.2 34.0 35.0 1459 0.0 49.6 18.6 199.0
DA 48.8 45.0 47.4 2116 0.0 95.2 44.8 199.0
BDA 48.8 45.0 47.4 2116 0.0 95.2 44.8 199.0
4h 4150 JM 94.3 39.6 41.2 1770 0.0 70.1 30.1 199.0
DA 91.5 45.0 47.4 2116 0.0 95.2 44.8 199.0
BDA 91.5 45.0 47.4 2116 0.0 95.2 44.8 199.0
4i 5100 JM 134.3 44.5 46.8 2080 0.0 92.5 43.2 199.0
DA 134.3 45.0 47.4 2116 0.0 95.2 44.8 199.0
BDA 134.3 45.0 47.4 2116 0.0 95.2 44.8 199.0
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Table D4
Solutions of medium-term scenario for cases 5 and 6.
Case β Mechanism Objective Exp. sales Q r Bd Br E[P(Q)] μðBdÞ
Nb. ($) ($ 106) (103 vehicles) (103 vehicles) ($) ($ 106) ($ 106) ($ 106) (103 vehicles)
5a 3200 JM 177.7 150.0 169.2 1789 33.9 268.3 89.5 686.7
DA 164.2 178.9 208.0 2116 29.7 378.6 141.1 672.6
BDA 154.8 142.8 166.0 2116 0.0 302.2 112.6 536.9
5b 4150 JM 351.1 212.8 248.1 2147 75.1 457.1 171.8 787.6
DA 351.0 209.5 243.5 2116 75.1 443.2 165.2 787.5
BDA 290.5 142.8 166.0 2116 0.0 302.2 112.6 536.9
5c 5100 JM 578.6 264.4 317.2 2484 113.3 656.7 267.3 844.9
DA 557.4 223.7 260.1 2116 110.1 473.4 176.4 841.0
BDA 426.2 142.8 166.0 2116 0.0 302.2 112.6 536.9
6a 3200 JM 165.7 123.6 132.0 1860 0.0 229.9 75.7 994.2
DA 158.9 146.6 158.6 2116 0.0 310.2 110.4 994.2
BDA 158.9 146.6 158.6 2116 0.0 310.2 110.4 994.2
6b 4150 JM 300.6 159.6 174.0 2267 0.0 361.8 133.5 994.2
DA 298.2 146.6 158.6 2116 0.0 310.2 110.4 994.2
BDA 298.2 146.6 158.6 2116 0.0 310.2 110.4 994.2
6c 5100 JM 467.6 191.5 212.7 2658 0.0 508.9 202.2 994.2
DA 437.5 146.6 158.6 2116 0.0 310.2 110.4 994.2
BDA 437.5 146.6 158.6 2116 0.0 310.2 110.4 994.2
Table D5
Solutions of medium-term scenario for case 7.
Case β Mechanism Objective Exp. sales Q r Bd Br E[P(Q)] μðBdÞ
Nb. ($) ($ 106) (103 vehicles) (103 vehicles) ($) ($ 106) ($ 106) ($ 106) (103 vehicles)
7a 3200 JM 373.5 268.0 278.6 1324 129.3 354.9 129.5 764.7
DA 256.7 330.2 360.1 2116 101.3 698.7 354.2 715.8
BDA 145.9 134.6 146.8 2116 0.0 284.9 144.4 291.8
7b 4150 JM 656.2 324.5 342.4 1569 181.4 509.1 215.7 828.6
DA 596.5 377.6 411.8 2116 171.6 799.1 405.0 818.6
BDA 273.8 134.6 146.8 2116 0.0 284.9 144.4 291.8
7c 5100 JM 986.3 368.9 394.9 1806 228.5 666.3 310.4 868.2
DA 966.7 399.7 435.9 2116 226.0 845.8 428.7 866.4
BDA 401.8 134.6 146.8 2116 0.0 284.9 144.4 291.8
7d 3200 JM 285.7 213.4 224.4 1413 95.8 301.5 111.9 737.6
DA 210.9 264.6 291.9 2116 75.9 559.8 270.6 694.5
BDA 149.1 137.5 151.7 2116 0.0 291.0 140.7 361.0
7e 4150 JM 515.1 267.3 286.4 1689 142.7 451.3 192.3 810.0
DA 485.0 306.0 337.6 2116 137.4 647.5 313.0 803.2
BDA 279.7 137.5 151.7 2116 0.0 291.0 140.7 361.0
7f 5100 JM 790.1 310.3 338.8 1956 185.5 607.2 282.2 854.4
DA 785.8 325.3 358.8 2116 184.9 688.3 332.7 853.9
BDA 410.4 137.5 151.7 2116 0.0 291.0 140.7 361.0
7g 3200 JM 231.7 174.2 185.1 1483 67.4 258.5 96.3 716.9
DA 181.5 216.4 240.9 2116 53.0 457.9 212.7 679.0
BDA 151.5 139.8 155.6 2116 0.0 295.8 137.4 438.6
7h 4150 JM 422.1 224.7 244.2 1785 109.4 401.0 170.1 796.4
DA 406.9 252.4 281.0 2116 106.5 534.1 248.1 792.1
BDA 284.3 139.8 155.6 2116 0.0 295.8 137.4 438.6
7i 5100 JM 655.7 265.8 295.1 2077 147.9 552.0 254.1 844.8
DA 655.5 269.2 299.7 2116 147.9 569.6 264.6 844.8
BDA 417.1 139.8 155.6 2116 0.0 295.8 137.4 438.6
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Table D6
Solutions of medium-term scenario for case 8.
Case β Mechanism Objective Exp. sales Q r Bd Br E[P(Q)] μðBdÞ
Nb. ($) ($ 106) (103 vehicles) (103 vehicles) ($) ($ 106) ($ 106) ($ 106) (103 vehicles)
8a 3200 JM 289.7 200.8 204.2 1299 92.1 260.7 94.8 742.2
DA 199.6 247.0 257.4 2116 68.1 522.7 267.1 688.6
BDA 150.0 138.3 144.2 2116 0.0 292.7 149.6 385.6
8b 4150 JM 502.3 245.1 251.1 1549 135.2 379.6 161.6 810.0
DA 456.1 286.6 298.7 2116 126.9 606.5 309.9 799.0
BDA 281.4 138.3 144.2 2116 0.0 292.7 149.6 385.6
8c 5100 JM 752.6 280.8 289.9 1799 174.4 505.2 237.6 852.4
DA 738.0 305.1 317.9 2116 172.3 645.5 329.9 850.4
BDA 412.8 138.3 144.2 2116 0.0 292.7 149.6 385.6
8d 3200 JM 223.4 152.9 156.3 1388 53.7 212.1 78.9 719.1
DA 168.0 189.7 198.8 2116 37.7 401.5 196.0 672.5
BDA 152.9 141.1 147.9 2116 0.0 298.5 145.8 500.1
8e 4150 JM 388.4 193.1 199.3 1672 90.1 322.8 138.8 794.7
DA 366.1 222.2 232.8 2116 85.8 470.1 229.5 787.4
BDA 287.0 141.1 147.9 2116 0.0 298.5 145.8 500.1
8f 5100 JM 588.0 226.2 235.8 1955 123.4 442.4 208.1 841.5
DA 585.0 237.3 248.6 2116 123.0 502.0 245.1 840.9
BDA 421.0 141.1 147.9 2116 0.0 298.5 145.8 500.1
8g 3200 JM 192.7 122.3 125.6 1459 20.2 178.4 66.9 714.9
DA 156.1 152.8 160.8 2116 9.5 323.3 152.0 675.5
BDA 155.1 143.1 150.6 2116 0.0 302.8 142.3 632.7
8h 4150 JM 326.5 158.2 164.4 1770 49.9 280.0 120.1 794.1
DA 315.4 178.6 188.0 2116 47.8 377.9 177.6 789.6
BDA 291.1 143.1 150.6 2116 0.0 302.8 142.3 632.7
8i 5100 JM 491.5 188.4 198.1 2080 77.4 392.0 182.8 842.8
DA 491.3 190.6 200.6 2116 77.4 403.3 189.6 842.7
BDA 427.0 143.1 150.6 2116 0.0 302.8 142.3 632.7
Table D7
Solutions of long-term scenario for cases 9 and 10.
Case β Mechanism Objective Exp. sales Q r Bd Br E[P(Q)] μðBdÞ
Nb. ($) ($ 106) (103 vehicles) (103 vehicles) ($) ($ 106) ($ 106) ($ 106) (103 vehicles)
9a 3200 JM 783.2 639.6 721.6 1789 119.3 1144.1 381.6 2927.8
DA 725.1 772.7 898.3 2116 112.5 1635.0 609.2 2904.8
BDA 588.3 542.7 630.9 2116 0.0 1148.3 427.9 2040.2
9b 4150 JM 1487.3 835.9 974.5 2147 186.7 1795.0 674.7 3093.0
DA 1486.7 822.7 956.5 2116 186.7 1740.9 648.7 3092.9
BDA 1103.8 542.7 630.9 2116 0.0 1148.3 427.9 2040.2
9c 5100 JM 2360.4 997.4 1196.3 2484 249.2 2477.2 1008.1 3186.9
DA 2280.4 846.0 983.6 2116 244.1 1790.2 667.1 3180.6
BDA 1619.4 542.7 630.9 2116 0.0 1148.3 427.9 2040.2
10a 3200 JM 554.6 413.8 441.9 1860 0.0 769.5 253.6 3328.1
DA 532.1 490.8 531.0 2116 0.0 1038.6 369.6 3328.1
BDA 532.1 490.8 531.0 2116 0.0 1038.6 369.6 3328.1
10b 4150 JM 1006.2 534.3 582.4 2267 0.0 1211.2 446.9 3328.1
DA 998.4 490.8 531.0 2116.0 0.0 1038.6 369.6 3328.1
BDA 998.4 490.8 531.0 2116 0.0 1038.6 369.6 3328.1
10c 5100 JM 1567.0 646.7 718.3 2658 12.3 1718.8 683.0 3357.6
DA 1465.5 494.1 534.5 2116 8.8 1045.4 372.0 3349.9
BDA 1464.6 490.8 531.0 2116 0.0 1038.6 369.6 3328.1
E.Z. Demirci, N.K. Erkip / Omega 69 (2017) 53–6966
Table D8
Solutions of long-term scenario for case 11.
Case β Mechanism Objective Exp. sales Q r Bd Br E[P(Q)] μðBdÞ
Nb. ($) ($ 106) (103 vehicles) (103 vehicles) ($) ($ 106) ($ 106) ($ 106) (103 vehicles)
11a 3200 JM 1733.9 1071.1 1113.1 1324 275.5 1418.0 517.4 3055.6
DA 1258.4 1372.7 1497.1 2116 229.6 2904.6 1472.3 2975.5
BDA 675.0 622.7 679.1 2116 0.0 1317.6 667.9 1349.8
11b 4150 JM 2833.9 1237.6 1306.0 1569 360.8 1941.5 822.7 3160.3
DA 2605.2 1450.3 1581.7 2116 344.8 3068.9 1555.5 3143.8
BDA 1266.6 622.7 679.1 2116 0.0 1317.6 667.9 1349.8
11c 5100 JM 4074.7 1370.1 1467.0 1806 438.0 2475.0 1152.8 3225.1
DA 4001.9 1486.5 1621.1 2116 433.8 3145.4 1594.3 3222.2
BDA 1858.1 622.7 679.1 2116 0.0 1317.6 667.9 1349.8
11d 3200 JM 1336.8 871.3 916.0 1413 220.6 1230.8 456.8 3011.1
DA 1026.3 1120.2 1235.8 2116 188.0 2370.4 1145.9 2940.6
BDA 637.9 588.4 649.1 2116 0.0 1245.1 601.9 1544.6
11e 4150 JM 2244.2 1032.7 1106.8 1689 297.5 1743.9 743.0 3129.7
DA 2127.9 1188.1 1310.6 2116 288.7 2514.0 1215.3 3118.7
BDA 1196.9 588.4 649.1 2116 0.0 1245.1 601.9 1544.6
11f 5100 JM 3289.2 1163.3 1269.7 1956 367.5 2275.9 1057.8 3202.5
DA 3273.0 1219.7 1345.5 2116 366.5 2580.8 1247.6 3201.6
BDA 1755.9 588.4 649.1 2116 0.0 1245.1 601.9 1544.6
11g 3200 JM 1068.1 723.6 768.5 1483 174.2 1073.4 399.9 2977.3
DA 856.5 929.0 1034.3 2116 150.6 1965.8 913.3 2915.2
BDA 609.1 561.9 625.5 2116 0.0 1188.9 552.4 1763.1
11h 4150 JM 1830.9 876.8 952.7 1785 242.9 1564.8 663.8 3107.6
DA 1771.6 988.1 1100.0 2116 238.2 2090.7 971.3 3100.4
BDA 1142.9 561.9 625.5 2116 0.0 1188.9 552.4 1763.1
11i 5100 JM 2725.4 1002.6 1113.0 2077 305.9 2082.1 958.7 3186.7
DA 2724.5 1015.5 1130.6 2116 305.9 2148.9 998.3 3186.7
BDA 1676.7 561.9 625.5 2116 0.0 1188.9 552.4 1763.1
Table D9
Solutions of long-term scenario for case 12.
Case β Mechanism Objective Exp. sales Q r Bd Br E[P(Q)] μðBdÞ
Nb. ($) ($ 106) (103 vehicles) (103 vehicles) ($) ($ 106) ($ 106) ($ 106) (103 vehicles)
12a 3200 JM 1338.1 816.6 830.4 1299 214.5 1060.4 385.5 3018.8
DA 964.4 1051.4 1095.7 2116 175.3 2224.7 1136.9 2931.0
BDA 627.6 578.9 603.4 2116 0.0 1225.0 626.0 1614.0
12b 4150 JM 2178.1 946.9 970.2 1549 285.1 1466.5 624.4 3129.8
DA 1998.9 1116.2 1163.3 2116 271.5 2361.9 1207.0 3111.8
BDA 1177.6 578.9 603.4 2116 0.0 1225.0 626.0 1614.0
12c 5100 JM 3130.0 1054.0 1088.1 1799 349.3 1896.3 891.7 3199.1
DA 3075.0 1146.4 1194.8 2116 345.9 2425.8 1239.7 3196.0
BDA 1727.6 578.9 603.4 2116 0.0 1225.0 626.0 1614.0
12d 3200 JM 996.8 633.6 647.8 1388 151.6 879.2 327.1 2980.9
DA 762.9 819.5 858.8 2116 125.4 1734.0 846.7 2904.6
BDA 592.2 546.3 572.5 2116 0.0 1156.0 564.5 1936.3
12e 4150 JM 1658.0 754.2 778.6 1672 211.2 1260.9 542.1 3104.7
DA 1570.6 872.6 914.5 2116 204.2 1846.4 901.6 3092.8
BDA 1111.2 546.3 572.5 2116 0.0 1156.0 564.5 1936.3
12f 5100 JM 2423.7 855.3 891.5 1955 265.8 1672.5 786.6 3181.3
DA 2412.5 897.3 940.4 2116 265.1 1898.7 927.1 3180.4
BDA 1630.2 546.3 572.5 2116 0.0 1156.0 564.5 1936.3
12g 3200 JM 788.9 508.7 522.6 1459 96.8 742.1 278.2 2974.0
DA 634.0 658.1 692.7 2116 79.4 1392.5 654.5 2909.6
BDA 566.3 522.4 550.0 2116 0.0 1105.5 519.6 2309.9
12h 4150 JM 1325.7 618.2 642.5 1770 145.5 1094.3 469.6 3103.8
DA 1282.4 700.3 737.2 2116 142.0 1481.9 696.5 3096.4
BDA 1062.6 522.4 550.0 2116 0.0 1105.5 519.6 2309.9
12i 5100 JM 1958.4 711.7 748.2 2080 190.5 1480.6 690.6 3183.4
DA 1957.9 720.0 757.9 2116 190.5 1523.5 716.1 3183.4
BDA 1559.0 522.4 550.0 2116 0.0 1105.5 519.6 2309.9
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Fig. 1. Examples of Pareto optimal curves.
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We present illustrative examples of Pareto optimal curves
based on the solutions of one case with lognormal distribution,
cv¼1.2, and s¼ $23;040. Figures plot the utility and expected sales
values in the increasing order of βs. Note that each star corre-
sponds to a different β value with its budget amount on the hor-
izontal axis. If one solves the subproblem provided in Appendix C
with the reported budget values, the same solutions will be
obtained.
Fig. 1a shows the optimal budget amounts and the resulting
utility values as defined in (15). Fig. 1b illustrates optimal budget
amounts and expected sales. As expected, expected sales shows a
diminishing rate of increase with respect to increase in budget.References
[1] Arcelus Francisco J, Kumar Satyendra, Srinivasan Gopalan. Pricing, rebate,
advertising and ordering policies of a retailer facing price-dependent sto-
chastic demand in newsvendor framework under different risk preferences.
International Transactions in Operational Research 2006;13(3):209–27.
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